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The paper analyzes the dynamic e®ects of anticipated and unanticipated monetary
policies on two large open economies that are dependent upon raw materials imports
(like crude oil) from a small third country. We can identify the small commodity-
exporting country with the OPEC nations and the domestic and the foreign economy
with the European Monetary Union and the USA respectively. It is assumed that the
dependency upon oil imports is stronger for the domestic than the foreign economy
and that oil imports are priced in terms of the foreign currency (dollars). This
implies an asymmetric macroeconomic structure of the two economies. We assume
sluggish price and wage adjustment on the supply side and a dynamic commodity
pricing rule which takes the form of a Phillips curve. We then discuss the impact
of monetary expansion in one economy on both the domestic and foreign economy
where the analysis is based on asymmetric behavior. We also analyze the dynamic
e®ects of commodity price disturbances and various monetary policy responses that
could be employed by the domestic and foreign central bank in an e®ort to reduce
the stag°ationary e®ects of oil price shocks.
It is shown that as a consequence of the endogenization of the rate of change of
the raw materials price a rise in the growth rate of domestic money supply is not
neutral in the long run but increases the domestic and foreign real commodity price.
By contrast, a rise in the growth rate of foreign money supply generally leads to
a decline in the real factor prices in the long run. A coordination of domestic and
foreign monetary policy is able to neutralize the in°ationary e®ects of commodity
price shocks. An international monetary policy coordination can also ¯x the output
vector at its initial pre-disturbance equilibrium level at all times. There exist optimal
monetary policies that guarantee perfect output stabilization and simultaneously
minimize deviations of the domestic and foreign in°ation rate from their respective
initial steady state level.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the macroeconomic model
of two large oil-dependent economies. Section 3 analyzes the dynamic e®ects both
of a unilateral increase in the growth rate of domestic and foreign money supply
on the two economies. Section 4 discusses the impacts of commodity price shocks
and various monetary policy responses to oil price disturbances. Section 5 summa-
rizes the main results. At the end, the paper includes an extensive mathematical
appendix.
2 The Macroeconomic Model
The following model stands in the Mundell/Fleming/Dornbusch/Phillips (MFDP)
tradition and extends similar models of Bhandari (1981) and Turnovsky (1986, 2000)
1to the case of large oil-dependent asymmetric economies. We consider two open
economies, each specializing in the production of a distinct ¯nal good. Both coun-
tries use imported raw materials from a small third country for the production of
their respective domestic output.1 The model is described by the equations (1){(20):
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where q = real output, y = real income, i = nominal interest rate, i ¡ _ pc = real
interest rate, pc = consumer price index (CPI), p = price of output, ¿ = ¯nal
goods terms of trade, e = nominal exchange rate (domestic currency price of foreign
currency), p¤
R = US dollar price of imported raw materials, p¤
R + e ¡ p = domestic
real factor price of imported raw materials, p¤
R ¡ p¤ = foreign real factor price of
imported raw materials, w = nominal wage rate, m = nominal money stock, ¼ =
augmentation term in the Phillips curve. All variables { except for the interest
rates i and i¤ { are expressed in logarithms. Dots denote time derivatives and
overbars steady state values. Foreign variables are denoted with an asterisk. We
1In what follows we use interchangeably the terms oil imports, raw materials imports and com-
modity imports.
2assume rational expectations with respect to the expected depreciation rate and the
in°ation rates.
Equations (1) and (2) are IS equations where private absorption (¯rst expression
in brackets) depends on national income and the real interest rate and where inter-
national trade in ¯nal goods (second expression in brackets) depends on domestic
income, foreign income and the ¯nal goods terms of trade ¿ (de¯ned in (3)).2 We as-
sume symmetric private demand functions. The corresponding e®ects across the two
economies are then identical and the coe±cients c1 and c2 in the bilateral trade bal-
ance coincide. Equations (4) and (5) are standard LM equations and re°ect money
market equilibrium in the economies. We assume symmetric money demand func-
tions. The uncovered interest parity condition (6) describes perfect substitutability
of domestic and foreign bonds. Equations (7) and (8) de¯ne the domestic and for-
eign consumer price index. We assume that the proportion of consumption spent
on the respective home good (®;®¤) is greater than 0.5 so that residents in both
countries have a preference for their own good. The expressions 1 ¡ ® and 1 ¡ ®¤
can be interpreted as the degree of demand side openness of the respective economy.
If we identify the foreign economy with the USA and the domestic economy with
the European Monetary Union (EMU) it is reasonable to assume 1 ¡ ®¤ < 1 ¡ ®
or, equivalently, ® > ®¤. Equations (9) and (10) describe the di®erence between
the respective domestic production and real income or gross national product. The
di®erence results from imports of intermediate goods which in turn depend on the
respective real factor price. We assume that raw materials imports (like crude oil)
are denominated in terms of the foreign currency (US dollars) so that the domestic
real factor price p¤
R +e¡p depends on the nominal exchange rate e. The constants
Ã and Ã¤ can be derived from a microeconomic pro¯t maximizing approach with
a CES production technology which allows for factor substitution between labor
and raw materials imports. It can be shown that in this case Ã is of the form
(1 ¡ ¹)(1 ¡ ¾)=¾, where ¾ is the elasticity of substitution between labor and raw
materials imports and where ¹ measures the share of labor in gross domestic output
(Bhandari and Turnvosky (1984)). The constant 1 ¡ ¹ then measures the share of
imported inputs in gross output and can be interpreted as a measure for the supply
side openness of the domestic economy. An analogous formula holds for Ã¤, and it
is reasonable to assume Ã > Ã¤ and 1 ¡ ¹ > 1 ¡ ¹¤, i.e., a stronger oil-dependency
and supply side openness for the EMU than for the USA.3 The equations (11) and
2In discrete time New Neoclassical New Keynesian synthesis models, private absorption does not
only depend positively on current income, but also depends positively on past and/or expected
future income (see, for example, Fuhrer and Moore (1995), Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999), King
(2000) or McCallum (2001)). In deterministic continuous time models (like ours) private absorption
only depends on the current income.
3In addition to the oil dependency, i.e. the ratio of net oil imports to GDP, the oil intensity, i.e.
the ratio of oil consumption to GDP, is greater for the EMU than for the USA (Anderton, di
3(12) describe the price adjustment in the domestic and foreign economy respectively
and are dynamic versions of mark-up pricing rules. In both countries the rate of
change of the price of output is a weighted average of nominal wage in°ation and
the rate of change of the domestic price of raw materials imports. Equations (13)
and (14) describe the dynamics of wage adjustment in form of standard augmented
Phillips curves (Buiter and Miller (1982)). The augmentation term is according to
(16) and (17) a linear combination of the trend rate and the core rate of in°ation,
the ¯rst given by the growth rate of money stock and the second by the rationally
anticipated in°ation rate based on the CPI.4 In (16), the parameter ¯ is a ¯xed
weight between zero and one and can be considered as a measure of wage indexation
(van der Ploeg (1990)). In the special case ¯ = 0 the growth rate of domestic real
wages only depends on the output gap q¡q. In the other polar case ¯ = 1 the wage-
Phillips curve describes the adjustment of nominal wages as a positive function of
the output gap and the growth rate of money supply. Assuming a low value of the
parameter ±, the case ¯ = 1 is consistent with nominal wage rigidity. In many mem-
ber countries of the EMU the degree of wage indexation is greater than in the USA
(Manasse (1991), OECD (2000)). We therefore assume 1¡¯ > 1¡¯¤, i.e., ¯ < ¯¤.
The third Phillips curve (15) describes the adjustment of the second factor price,
the price of oil. We assume that the growth rate of the foreign commodity price is
a positive function of the world output gap q + q¤ ¡ (q + q¤). The augmentation
term ¼¤
R is a ¯xed weight linear combination of the growth rate of foreign money
supply and the foreign in°ation rate. The di®erence 1 ¡ ¯¤
R measures the degree of
commodity price indexation to the foreign in°ation rate _ p¤. Since the commodity
price p¤
R is expressed in terms of the foreign currency, a positive in°ation rate _ p¤ > 0
leads to an ongoing reduction in the purchasing power of the oil exporting nation
if _ p¤
R is not indexed to _ p¤. It is therefore reasonable to assume 1 ¡ ¯¤
R > 0, i.e.,
¯¤
R < 1. Moreover, a situation in which the world output lies above its natural level
induces a high world wide demand for oil causing an upward pressure on the price
of oil. In the following we assume a positive but small demand coe±cient ±¤
R and a
high value of ¯¤
R which is smaller than one. The last two equations (19) and (20)
describe the long run output supply depending on the ¯nal goods terms of trade and
the real commodity price. These equations result from the static analogue of the
dynamic price and wage equations where complete wage indexation (¯ = ¯¤ = 0)
Mauro and Moneta (2004)). Note that our model assumption regarding the dependency of the two
large open economies on imported raw materials produced only by a third small country leads to
an identity of these concepts.
4The formulation of the in°ation dynamics can also be interpreted as a special type of a continuous
time hybrid Phillips curve. In a discrete time model, the hybrid Phillips curve formulation allows
in°ation to depend on expected future and lagged in°ation (see, for example, Gali and Gertler
(1999)). Instead of a backward-looking element in the hybrid Phillips curve, we model a dependency
of the in°ation dynamics on the trend in°ation rate given by the growth rate of money supply.
4is assumed. In this case the coe±cients f1 and f2 are given by f1 = (1 ¡ ®)=± and
f2 = (1 ¡ ¹)=(¹±) respectively with f2 > f1. On the assumption that the domestic
economy is stronger oil-dependent than the foreign economy (i.e., 1 ¡ ¹ > 1 ¡ ¹¤),
the parameter f2 is greater than its foreign analogue f¤
2 (provided that the static
wage equations w = pc + ±q and w¤ = p¤c + ±¤q¤ have similar coe±cients ± and ±¤
so that (1 ¡ ¹)¹¤=((1 ¡ ¹¤)¹) > ±=±¤ holds).
The dynamic behavior of the whole system (1){(20) can be described by a three-
dimensional dynamic system. Assuming positive growth rates of domestic and for-
eign money supply, steady state values of the domestic and foreign price level and
the nominal exchange rate do not exist. It is therefore convenient to express the dy-
namics of the system in terms of real liquidity and real competitiveness (Buiter and
Miller (1982)). Exploiting the decomposition method by Aoki (1981) and Fukuda
(1993) we use the state variables ls = (m¡p)+(m¤¡p¤), ld = (m¡p)¡(m¤¡p¤) and
¿ = p ¡ (p¤ + e) for the state space representation of the model.5 The sum and the
di®erence of domestic and foreign real money supply are backward-looking or pre-
determined variables containing the sluggish price variables p and p¤. By contrast,
the terms of trade ¿ are a forward-looking or jump variable moving discontinuously
whenever the nominal exchange rate jumps. Although the adjustment of ¯nal goods
prices and factor prices is assumed to be sluggish the in°ation rates _ p and _ p¤ are
jump variables as well that can adjust instantaneously. In the following we assume
that at time t = 0 both economies are in steady state and of equal size. At time
t = 0 a monetary policy change is anticipated to take place at some future time
T > 0.
3 Dynamic E®ects of Expansionary Monetary Pol-
icy
In this chapter we discuss the dynamic e®ects of a unilateral once-and-for-all increase
in the growth rate of money supply (d _ m > 0;d _ m¤ > 0). We ¯rst consider the
steady state e®ects, thereafter the dynamic e®ects where we distinguish between an
unanticipated and an anticipated monetary policy.
3.1 Steady State E®ects
The steady state e®ects of an increase in the domestic and foreign growth rate of
money supply are presented in table 1. They result from the steady state condi-
tion _ ¿ = _ ls = _ ld = 0 implying classical results with respect to the change of the
5The state space representation and the solution time paths of the state variables are provided in
the mathematic appendix. As long as the degree of supply side openness is not extremely large,
the state form of the dynamic macro model exhibits saddle point stability.
5in°ation rates at home and abroad and the rate of depreciation _ e. Since during the
course of adjustment a rise in the growth rate of domestic money supply leads to
an overshooting of the corresponding in°ation rate (_ p > _ m), the real money stock
m ¡ p declines in the long run implying a steady state rise in the nominal interest
rate.6 In case _ m > 0 and given a constant level of the foreign money stock ( _ m¤ = 0)
a similar result holds with respect to the foreign real money stock and the foreign
nominal interest rate where the interest parity condition (6) implies a positive nom-
inal interest rate di®erential (di¡ di
¤ = d_ e = d _ m > 0).7 Since the real appreciation
rate _ ¿ is zero in the long run there is no real steady state interest rate di®erential.
Instead, expansionary domestic monetary policy causes a long run rise in domestic
and foreign real interest rate of equal size. This result stands in sharp contrast to
traditional MFDP models where monetary policy is neutral in the long run. In our
dynamic macro model with an endogenous commodity pricing rule for the rate of
change of the price of oil, domestic monetary policy is not neutral.8 Instead, it has
perverse real steady state e®ects. Under the fairly weak condition (cf. Wohltmann
and Winkler (2005 a))
(1 ¡ a1 + 2c1)(f2 ¡ f
¤
2) > (a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã
¤) (21)
an increase in the growth rate of domestic money stock causes a long run real
appreciation of the domestic currency (d¿ > 0). Moreover, a steady state rise in the
real factor prices p¤
R¡p¤ and p¤
R+e¡p occurs. The reason is that during the course
of adjustment the world output gap qw ¡ qw (qw = q + q¤) is always positive. The
commodity pricing rule (15) which is equivalent to the equation
_ p
¤










then implies a positive growth rate of the foreign real factor price p¤
R ¡p¤ (although
there is a weak positive foreign in°ation rate _ p¤ after the implementation of the
domestic monetary shock inducing an opposing e®ect on _ p¤
R¡ _ p¤). Compared to the
steady state change of the terms of trade ¿, the rise in the real commodity price
p¤
R ¡ p¤ is strong. According to the relationship
p
¤




6This is a well known result of MFDP models with rational expectations and sluggish price and
wage adjustment.
7On the assumption _ m¤ = 0 a steady state value of the foreign price level p¤ exists so that
d(m¤ ¡ p¤) = ¡dp¤ holds.
8In our model, neutrality of domestic monetary policy only holds in the special case ±¤
R = 0, i.e.,
if the world output gap is not an argument of the commodity pricing rule.
6the domestic real factor price must also increase in the long run, where the steady
state rise in p¤
R + e ¡ p is smaller than the increase in p¤
R ¡ p¤ if d¿=d _ m > 0 holds.
The long run rise in the domestic and foreign real commodity price leads to the
striking result that an increase in the growth rate of domestic money supply causes
a steady state contraction of real output and income in both economies.9 Since we
have assumed that the domestic economy is stronger oil-dependent than the foreign
economy the domestic output contraction is generally stronger than the decline in
foreign output. This result holds although the steady state rise in the domestic
terms of trade ¿ has a positive impact on long run domestic output q while its
impact on q¤ is negative (cf. equations (19) and (20)). However, since the rise in
¿ is weak compared with the steady state increase in the real factor prices p¤
R ¡ p¤
and p¤
R + e ¡ p, the output contraction occurs in both economies. The assumption
f2 > f¤
2 then generally leads to a stronger decline in q than q¤. A further remarkable
result is that the magnitude of the output contraction depends on the length T of
the time interval between the anticipation and the implementation of the monetary
policy shock. The shorter this time span, the stronger are the steady state e®ects
of monetary policy. This implies that an unanticipated increase in the growth rate
of domestic money supply has stronger contractionary steady state output e®ects
than an anticipated monetary expansion. To explain this, consider the domestic and
foreign price and wage equations (11), (12), (13) and (14) which can be combined
and transformed into the aggregate supply functions
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Domestic output is a positive function of the domestic real appreciation rate _ ¿ while
q¤ is a negative function of _ ¿. Since the supply side of both economies is asymmetric,
aggregate or real world output qw also depends on _ ¿.10 We have assumed that oil
imports are completely invoiced in terms of the foreign currency and that the degree
of wage indexation is greater in the domestic than in the foreign economy. On these
assumptions the world output gap qw ¡qw is a positive function of _ ¿. Inserting this
equation into equation (22) for the growth rate of the foreign real commodity price
it follows by integration that the real factor price p¤
R¡p¤ is a positive function of the
terms of trade ¿. Since p¤
R ¡ p¤ adjusts sluggishly by assumption while ¿ jumps at
the date of anticipation by the amount ¿(0+)¡¿0, the foreign real commodity price
9A similar result with respect to domestic real output (but not with respect to domestic private
consumption) also holds in models of the New Open Economy Macroeconomics. See Obstfeld and
Rogo® (1995, 1996).
10In the special case ¯ = ¯¤, ® = ®¤, ± = ±¤ and ¹ = ¹¤ = 1 world output is independent of _ ¿ and
equals qw for all t.
7must be a negative function of the initial jump of ¿. This holds during the whole
course of adjustment so that the steady state change of p¤
R ¡ p¤ depends negatively
on the initial terms of trade di®erence ¿(0+) ¡ ¿0. Now it is a well known result
that the initial jump of ¿ increases the shorter the anticipation phase (0;T).11 Since
an expansionary domestic monetary policy leads on impact to a nominal and real
depreciation of the domestic currency (¿(0+) ¡ ¿0 < 0), the steady state rise in
p¤
R ¡ p¤ and the output contraction in both economies must be stronger in case
T = 0 than in case T > 0.
An analogous result holds for foreign monetary policy, i.e., the steady state e®ects
of an unanticipated increase in the growth rate of foreign money supply (d _ m¤ > 0)
are stronger than an anticipated foreign monetary expansion. An interesting result is
that the long run real output, income and relative price e®ects of foreign monetary
policy are usually opposite in sign than the corresponding steady state e®ects of
domestic monetary policy (cf. table 1). In contrast to domestic monetary policy
expansionary foreign monetary policy generally causes a long run fall in the real
commodity prices p¤
R¡p¤ and p¤
R+e¡p implying a steady state rise in domestic and
foreign output and income. This result holds as long as the coe±cient ¯¤
R in equation
(22) for the growth rate of the real factor price p¤
R ¡ p¤ is not too small relative to
the second coe±cient ±¤
R. In this case the overshooting of the foreign in°ation rate
(_ p¤ > _ m¤) which occurs during the course of adjustment induces a negative growth
rate of the foreign real commodity price p¤
R ¡ p¤ that can not be reversed by a
positive world output gap.12 This implies a steady state fall in the real factor price
p¤
R ¡ p¤ inducing a long run rise in foreign and domestic output. Although there is
in general a long run real appreciation of the foreign currency (provided condition
(21) is met) and { as a consequence { a weaker fall in the domestic than the foreign
real commodity price, the steady state rise in domestic output is stronger than the
foreign output expansion. This is a consequence of our assumption f2 > f¤
2 in the
long run supply functions (19) and (20). Foreign monetary policy is ine±cient in
the long run only if the polar case ¯¤
R = 0 = ±¤
R is considered. Equation (22) then
implies _ p¤
R ¡ _ p¤ = 0 so that the foreign real commodity price is constant over time.
In this special case the steady state values of all relative prices remain unchanged so
that foreign monetary policy is neutral in the long run. As in the case of domestic
monetary policy, foreign monetary policy can also be connected with perverse steady
state output e®ects. While a rise in the domestic monetary growth rate _ m always
induces a steady state fall in q and q¤ (provided ±¤
R > 0 holds), an analogous foreign
monetary expansion only leads to a long run output contraction if ±¤
R is positive and
the coe±cient ¯¤
R in (22) very small, in particular equal to zero.
11See, for example, Turnovsky (2000).
12Note that in case of domestic monetary policy (d _ m¤ > 0) the growth rate _ p¤
R ¡ _ p¤ is always
positive. This result even holds if ¯¤
R is large and ±¤
R very small.
8d _ m > 0, _ m¤ = 0 d _ m¤ > 0, _ m = 0
d_ p = d_ pc = d _ w = d _ m > 0 d_ p¤ = d_ p¤c = d _ w¤ = d _ m¤ > 0
d_ p¤ = d_ p¤c = d _ w¤ = d_ p¤
R = 0 d_ p = d_ pc = d _ w = 0
d_ e = d _ m > 0 d_ e = ¡d _ m¤ < 0
d(m ¡ p) < 0 d(m ¡ p) > 0
d(m¤ ¡ p¤) < 0 d(m¤ ¡ p¤) < 0
dp¤ > 0 dp < 0
d(i ¡ _ pc) = d(i¤ ¡ _ p¤c) > 0 d(i ¡ _ pc) = d(i¤ ¡ _ p¤c) < 0
di > di
¤ > 0 di
¤ > 0 > di
d¿ > 0 d¿ < 0
d(p¤
R + e ¡ p) > 0 d(p¤
R + e ¡ p) < 0
d(p¤
R ¡ p¤) > 0 d(p¤
R ¡ p¤) < 0
dq < 0 dq > 0
dq¤ < 0 dq¤ > 0
dy < 0 dy > 0
dy¤ < 0 dy¤ > 0
Table 1: Long run e®ects of domestic and foreign monetary policy
3.2 Dynamic E®ects of Unanticipated Monetary Policy
We ¯rst consider an unanticipated unit increase in the growth rate of domestic money
supply, with the foreign money supply held constant; that is d _ m = 1;d _ m¤ = 0. The
dynamic e®ects are illustrated in ¯gures 1 to 4 (solid lines), where the assumption
is made that ±¤
R > 0. In that case domestic monetary policy is non-neutral in the
long run. Figure 1 (a) shows the response of the domestic terms of trade ¿ which
is similar to the adjustment of ¿ in MFD overshooting models. On impact, the
domestic monetary expansion induces a real depreciation of the domestic currency.
Thereafter, a process of real appreciation towards the new steady state ¿ 1 takes
place. On the assumption (21) ¿1 is greater than the initial steady state ¿0. An
analogous response results for the domestic and foreign real interest rate (¯gure 1
(b) and 1 (c)) where the new steady states (i ¡ _ pc)1 and (i¤ ¡ _ p¤c)1 coincide and
are larger than the corresponding initial steady states. The development of the
domestic and foreign real commodity price is illustrated in ¯gure 2. On impact,
the domestic real factor price p¤
R + e ¡ p overshoots its long run response where
the jump in t = 0 corresponds with the initial jump of ¿. Thereafter, p¤
R + e ¡ p
converges from above to its new steady state (p¤
R + e ¡ p)1 which is greater than the
initial value (p¤
R + e ¡ p)0. The foreign real factor price p¤
R ¡ p¤ behaves sluggishly
at time t = 0 and increases gradually during the course of adjustment (¯gure 2
(b)). The permanent rise in p¤
R ¡ p¤ is a consequence of the commodity pricing
9rule (15) which induces a growth rate of the nominal factor price p¤
R greater than
the foreign in°ation rate _ p¤ for all 0 < t < 1. Therefore, the growth rate of the
foreign real factor price, i.e., _ p¤
R ¡ _ p¤, is positive throughout the whole adjustment
process (¯gure 2 (c)) implying a monotonous rise in p¤
R ¡ p¤ for t > 0. Figure 3
illustrates the domestic and foreign output response. The short term and medium
term development of domestic output q is familiar from traditional MFDP models.13
On impact, an output expansion takes place which is a consequence of the initial
real depreciation of the domestic currency and the fall in the real interest rate.
Although the initial rise in the domestic real commodity price induces { in isolation
{ a reduction in national income and private absorption, this contractionary e®ect on
aggregate demand is dominated by the expansionary e®ects caused by the fall in the
terms of trade and the real interest rate. After its initial rise domestic output begins
to fall, which is a consequence of the process of real appreciation and the increase in
the domestic real interest rate after the impact phase. Since the new steady state
values of ¿, i ¡ _ pc and p¤
R + e ¡ p are larger than the corresponding initial values,
a long run reduction in aggregate demand and real output takes place. A similar
development results for foreign output q¤ (¯gure 3 (b)). On impact, there is a real
appreciation of the foreign currency and a decrease in the foreign real interest rate so
that the net e®ect on aggregate demand is ambiguous. As illustrated in ¯gure 1, the
terms of trade e®ect dominates the opposing interest rate e®ect implying a slight fall
in q¤ on impact. Thereafter, the decrease in foreign output is magni¯ed which is a
consequence of the gradual rise in the foreign real factor price p¤
R¡p¤ and the interest
rate i¤¡ _ p¤c inducing a decline in private absorption. On the other hand, the process
of real depreciation of the foreign currency after the initial response improves net
exports of ¯nal goods while the domestic output and income contraction causes { in
isolation { a deterioration of the foreign trade balance with respect to the domestic
economy. Since the overall e®ect on foreign aggregate demand is unambiguously
negative, the initial foreign output contraction is ampli¯ed during the course of
further adjustment. In the long run foreign output lies below its initial steady state
level. However, the steady state output contraction is slightly weaker than the long
run fall in domestic output. This implies that the output di®erential q ¡ q¤, which
is positive in the short run (i.e. q > q¤ for su±ciently small t > 0), changes sign
during the course of adjustment (¯gure 3 (c)). On the other hand, the world output
gap qw ¡ qw, i.e. the di®erence between aggregate output and the new steady state
level of world output, is always positive (¯gure 3 (d)).
Figure 4 illustrates the response of the in°ation rates _ p, _ p¤ and _ p¤
R.14 The domes-
tic in°ation rate is characterized by an overshooting (_ p > _ m = 1 for 0 < t < 1) and
13See, for example, Turnovsky (1986) and Clausen and Wohltmann (2005).
14The development of _ pc and _ w is similar to the response of _ p and need not be discussed here. The
same holds for the foreign in°ation rate _ p¤c and _ w¤ which behave similar like _ p¤.
10converges from above towards the new level of the growth rate of domestic money
supply. On the other hand, the foreign in°ation rates _ p¤ and _ p¤
R, which are smaller
than the domestic in°ation rate _ p, converge from above towards their initial level
_ p¤
0 = (_ p¤
R)0 = _ m¤ = 0. Since _ p¤ is positive for 0 < t < 1 the foreign price level has
increased permanently (dp¤ > 0) so that expansionary domestic monetary policy
induces permanent stag°ation abroad.
Figures 1 to 4 also contain the response of the endogenous variables in case of
a unilateral foreign monetary shock, that is, d _ m¤ = 1, d _ m = 0 (dashed lines). The
adjustment processes are based on the assumption that the coe±cient ¯¤
R in the
commodity pricing rule (15) is su±ciently large compared to ±¤
R. In that case the
domestic and foreign steady state output increase while the steady state values of
the real factor prices decrease. The dynamic response of the real commodity prices
p¤
R ¡ p¤ and p¤
R + e ¡ p is opposite to the corresponding development of the factor
prices in case d _ m > 0 (¯gure 1). Foreign output behaves similar to the adjustment
of domestic output in case d _ m > 0. After its initial increase, which is a result of the
initial real depreciation of the foreign currency, foreign output falls towards its new
steady state level which is greater than the initial steady state of q¤. This holds since
the new steady state values of ¿, p¤
R ¡ p¤ and i¤ ¡ _ p¤c lie below their corresponding
initial values. The development of domestic output is opposite to the corresponding
response of foreign output q¤ in case of the domestic monetary policy d _ m > 0. On
impact, a domestic output expansion takes place, although the domestic currency
appreciates in the short run and the domestic real interest rate rises. On the other
hand, the short term decrease in the real factor price p¤
R + e ¡ p causes a rise in
domestic private absorption, while the foreign output expansion leads to an increase
in domestic ¯nal goods exports. After the impact phase, domestic output increases
further, which is a consequence of the continuous reduction in the domestic terms
of trade and the domestic real interest rate after their initial jump.
The steady state decline in the foreign real factor price p¤
R ¡ p¤ results from an
overshooting of the foreign in°ation rate (_ p¤ > _ m¤ = 1) which is larger than the
positive growth rate of the commodity price (_ p¤ > _ p¤
R).15 Since the aggregate steady
state output increases (dq + dq¤ > 0) the world output gap is small so that the
rate of change of the commodity price is basically determined by the weighted sum
of _ m¤ and _ p¤. By contrast, in the case of domestic monetary policy, the foreign
in°ation rate is small and the world output gap large so that the response of _ p¤
R is
similar to the development of the world output gap. An interesting result concerning
the domestic in°ation rate _ p is that the foreign monetary policy d _ m¤ > 0 causes
temporary de°ation in the domestic economy. _ p falls on impact and runs below
15Note that this result does not hold if ¯¤
R is very small (in particular equal to zero) and ±¤
R
su±ciently large. In this case _ p¤
R increases on impact by a large amount and is greater than _ p¤ so
that the real factor price p¤
R ¡ p¤ rises and q¤ and q fall in the long run.
11its initial steady state level _ p0 = 0 for all 0 < t < 1 (¯gure 4). The economic
explanation is the negative domestic output gap (q ¡ q1 < 0) which leads to a
negative rate of change of the domestic wage rate ( _ w < 0). This in turn causes a
negative in°ation rate _ p so that expansionary foreign monetary policy is connected
with a disin°ationary boom in the domestic economy.16 By contrast, an increase in
the growth rate of domestic money supply causes an in°ationary recession in the
foreign economy.
Parameter Value Description
a1 0.8 Marginal propensity to consume
c1 = c2 0.2 Income elasticity of international trade in ¯nal goods
c3 0.3 Terms of trade elasticity of international trade
in ¯nal goods
a2 0.8 Semi-interest elasticity of private absorption
1 ¡ ® 0.25 Degree of demand side openness of the domestic economy
1 ¡ ®¤ 0.2 Degree of demand side openness of the foreign economy
l1 1.0 Income elasticity of money demand
l2 1.5 Semi-interest elasticity of money demand
1 ¡ ¹ 0.3 Degree of supply side openness of the domestic economy
1 ¡ ¹¤ 0.2 Degree of supply side openness of the foreign economy
1 ¡ ¯ 0.8 Degree of wage indexation in the domestic economy
1 ¡ ¯¤ 0.4 Degree of wage indexation in the foreign economy
± = ±¤ 0.25 Output gap elasticity of wage in°ation
¾ 0.3 Elasticity of substitution between labor and oil
1 ¡ ¯¤
R 0.2 Degree of commodity price indexation to foreign in°ation
±¤
R 0.1 World output gap elasticity of commodity price in°ation
¸V 0.85 Weight of long run monetary change in the loss function V3
Table 2: Parameter values
16Note that this result does not hold if ¯¤
R is zero and ±¤
R > 0. In this special case q and _ p on impact
rise by a large amount and fall strongly thereafter, where q1 lies below its initial pre-disturbance
level.
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Figure 1: Responses of terms of trade ¿, domestic real interest rate i¡ _ pc and foreign real
interest rate i¤ ¡ _ p¤c to an unanticipated domestic (solid lines) and to an unanticipated
foreign (dashed lines) permanent expansionary monetary policy shock; initial steady
states: dotted lines
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Figure 2: Responses of domestic real commodity price p¤
R+e¡p, foreign real commodity
price p¤
R ¡ p¤ and growth rate of foreign real commodity price _ p¤
R ¡ _ p¤ to an unantici-
pated domestic (solid lines) and to an unanticipated foreign (dashed lines) permanent
expansionary monetary policy shock











































_ m; _ m¤
_ p; _ p¤
(a)











































_ m; _ m¤
_ p; _ p¤
(b)









































_ m; _ m¤
_ p; _ p¤
(c)











































_ m; _ m¤
_ p; _ p¤
(d)
Figure 3: Responses of domestic output q, foreign output q¤, output di®erential q ¡ q¤
and world output gap qw ¡ qw to an unanticipated domestic (solid lines) and to an
unanticipated foreign (dashed lines) permanent expansionary monetary policy shock
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Figure 4: Responses of domestic in°ation rate _ p, foreign in°ation rate _ p¤ and growth
rate nominal commodity price _ p¤
R to an unanticipated domestic (solid lines) and to an
unanticipated foreign (dashed lines) permanent expansionary monetary policy shock
163.3 Dynamic E®ects of Anticipated Monetary Policy
We now consider the behavior of the domestic and foreign economy in response to
a unilateral monetary expansion which is credibly announced at time t = 0 to take
place at some future time T > 0. We restrict the discussion to the response of the
relevant variables during the anticipation phase 0 < t < T, i.e., before the monetary
shock actually occurs. The behavior of the economies for t > T is very similar to
the case T = 0 and need not be discussed once more. Note that the steady state
e®ects in case of an anticipated monetary policy are in absolute terms smaller than
in case of an equivalent unanticipated monetary shock.
The dynamic e®ects of an anticipated unilateral increase in the growth rate
of domestic or foreign money supply are illustrated in ¯gures 5 to 8. The solid
lines show the response in case of domestic monetary policy (d _ m = 1, d _ m¤ = 0),
the dashed lines illustrate the dynamic behavior of the system if the growth rate
of foreign money supply is increased (d _ m¤ = 1, d _ m = 0). We ¯rst consider the
dynamic e®ects of an anticipated rise in _ m. As in the case of an unanticipated
monetary policy the terms of trade ¿ fall on impact where the real depreciation
of the domestic currency is now smaller than in case T = 0. If the time span
between the anticipation and the implementation of the domestic monetary policy
is su±ciently large the initial depreciation is slightly magni¯ed until the end of
the anticipation period. For t > T the development of ¿ is equivalent to the case
T = 0. The domestic and foreign real interest rate fall on impact and lie below their
initial steady state level throughout the whole anticipation period 0 < t < T. At
the date of implementation of the expansionary monetary policy both interest rates
decrease once more. For t > T the behavior of the real interest rates is similar to the
corresponding response in case T = 0. The foreign real factor price p¤
R ¡ p¤, which
is illustrated in ¯gure 6 (b), continuously increases which already occurs before the
implementation of the monetary policy. The reason is a de°ationary process in the
foreign economy throughout the time interval 0 < t < T, while the rate of change of
the commodity price is positive on impact. The growth rate _ p¤
R ¡ _ p¤ of the foreign
real factor price is therefore positive on impact and remains greater zero during the
whole course of adjustment. The domestic real commodity price p¤
R + e ¡ p jumps
on impact by the same amount as ¿ (but in the opposite direction) and increases
further until time T (¯gure 6 (a)). Although the domestic in°ation rate _ p is positive
and increasing during the time span 0 < t < T, and the rate of change of the
commodity price (_ p¤
R) is small, the depreciation rate _ e is so large that it induces a
positive growth rate of the domestic real factor price p¤
R+e¡p for 0 < t < T.17 After
17Since _ e is positive and increasing over the interval (0;T) this leads to rising in°ation rates _ p, _ pc
and _ w in the domestic economy and to de°ation in the foreign economy. In contrast to domestic
in°ation, foreign de°ation is weak since the depreciation rate _ e is not a direct argument of the
foreign pricing rule (12).
17the realization of the monetary shock at time T, p¤
R+e¡p begins to fall towards its
new steady state level. As in the case T = 0, domestic output q increases on impact
and falls thereafter until time T (¯gure 7 (a)). The behavior of q after the impact
phase is a consequence of the rise in the domestic real commodity price and the
domestic real interest rate during this time span. Moreover, foreign output declines
on impact and thereafter until time T leading to a reduction in domestic exports
of ¯nal goods. At the time of implementation of the expansionary monetary policy,
both output variables increase (due to the fall in the real interest rates at time T).
Thereafter, q and q¤ behave as in the case T = 0, i.e. fall towards their new steady
state levels.
The anticipation e®ects of an anticipated increase in the growth rate of foreign
money supply with respect to the domestic terms of trade, the real factor prices, the
real interest rates, the output variables and the in°ation rates are opposite to the
corresponding e®ects of an expansionary domestic monetary policy. The fall in the
foreign real commodity price p¤
R¡p¤ results from the positive foreign in°ation rate _ p¤
and the initial decrease in the rate of change of the commodity price, _ p¤
R. Since the
anticipation of a future rise in _ m¤ is connected with a process of nominal depreciation
of the foreign currency (_ e < 0) this induces a de°ationary process in the domestic
economy and a reduction in the real factor price p¤
R + e ¡ p during the anticipation
period. The domestic output q falls on impact which is a consequence of the rise
in the domestic terms of trade and the domestic real interest rate. The decline in
the real factor price p¤
R +e¡p, the dampening of the initial rise in the interest rate
i ¡ _ pc and the increase in foreign output cause a weak domestic output expansion
after the impact phase. During the whole time span 0 < t < T domestic output lies
below its initial steady state level which can be explained with the strong increase
in ¿. By contrast, foreign output q¤ lies above its pre-disturbance equilibrium level
q¤
0, where the initial expansion is magni¯ed until time T. The implementation of
the foreign monetary policy shock generates positive jumps of the output variables
which are a consequence of the discontinuous fall in the real interest rates at time
T. Thereafter, foreign output converges from above to its new steady state level,
whereas for t > T the development of domestic output is generally not monotonic,
but hump-shaped.18 After a sharp fall, induced by the rise in the domestic real
factor price and an overshooting of the domestic real interest rate, domestic output
rises again and converges from below to its new steady state level.
18An exception is the case that ¯¤
R is su±ciently large and ±¤
R = 0. The other polar case ¯¤
R = 0 and
±¤
R su±ciently large leads again to a hump-shaped development of q. This case causes extremely
high jumps of q and q¤ at time T, and thereafter a very strong contractionary process ending in
lower steady state levels of q and q¤ as initially.
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Figure 5: Responses of terms of trade ¿, domestic real interest rate i¡ _ pc and foreign real
interest rate i¤¡ _ p¤c to an anticipated domestic (solid lines) and to an anticipated foreign
(dashed lines) permanent expansionary monetary policy shock during the anticipation
phase 0 < t < T (left) and during the implementation phase t > T (right); initial steady
states: dotted lines
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Figure 6: Responses of domestic real commodity price p¤
R+e¡p, foreign real commodity
price p¤
R ¡ p¤ and growth rate of foreign real commodity price _ p¤
R ¡ _ p¤ to an anticipated
domestic (solid lines) and to an anticipated foreign (dashed lines) permanent expan-
sionary monetary policy shock during the anticipation phase 0 < t < T (left) and during
the implementation phase t > T (right)
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Figure 7: Responses of domestic output q, foreign output q¤ and world output gap qw¡qw
to an anticipated domestic (solid lines) and to an anticipated foreign (dashed lines)
permanent expansionary monetary policy shock during the anticipation phase 0 < t < T
(left) and during the implementation phase t > T (right)
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Figure 8: Responses of domestic in°ation rate _ p, foreign in°ation rate _ p¤ and growth
rate of nominal commodity price _ p¤
R to an anticipated domestic (solid lines) and to
an anticipated foreign (dashed lines) permanent expansionary monetary policy shock
during the anticipation phase 0 < t < T (left) and during the implementation phase
t > T (right)
224 Commodity Price Shocks and Monetary Policy
Response
In this section we discuss at ¯rst brie°y the dynamic e®ects of an exogenous com-
modity price shock (like an anticipated increase in the oil price). We then analyze
the consequences of monetary policy reactions that could be employed in an e®ort
to reduce the potentially disruptive e®ects of oil price shocks.
4.1 Dynamic E®ects of Oil Price Shocks
It is well known that a commodity price increase (dp¤
R > 0) causes long run stag°a-
tion for oil-dependent economies (that is, dq < 0, dp > 0, dq¤ < 0, dp¤ > 0) and
balance of trade problems.19 The strength of the output contraction and the price
increase depends on the degree of oil-dependency (i.e., the values of the coe±cients
Ã, 1 ¡ ¹ and f2 in the model equations (9), (11) and (19)). On the assumption
Ã > Ã¤, ¹ < ¹¤ and f2 > f¤
2 the stag°ationary e®ects of a commodity price shock
are stronger for the domestic than for the foreign economy. It can be shown that
the contractionary steady state e®ects of oil price shocks can be reduced for both
economies if oil imports are denominated in terms of the domestic rather than the
foreign currency (Wohltmann and Winkler (2005 a)).
The dynamic e®ects of an anticipated increase in the price of oil (dp¤
R > 0) are
illustrated in ¯gures 9 to 13. The solid lines show the behavior of the domestic and
foreign economy in the polar case ¯¤
R = 1, ±¤
R = 0, the dashed lines illustrate the
response of the system if ¯¤
R < 1 and ±¤
R > 0 (but su±ciently small). Assuming
constant values of the domestic and foreign money stock ( _ m = _ m¤ = 0) the case
¯¤
R = 1, ±¤
R = 0 is equivalent to a zero growth rate of the commodity price (_ p¤
R = 0),
while in the case ¯¤
R < 1, ±¤
R > 0 the rate of change _ p¤
R is a positive function of
the foreign in°ation rate and the world output gap.20 The anticipation e®ects of
a unit increase in the commodity price p¤
R are in qualitative terms identical to the
corresponding impacts of a unit rise in the growth rate of domestic money supply
(d _ m = 1). In quantitative terms, the anticipation e®ects of the price shock dp¤
R = 1
are smaller (in particular the initial jumps of ¿, q, q¤ and the interest rates). On the
other hand, the steady state e®ects with respect to real output and relative prices
are considerably larger than in case d _ m = 1. The reason is that at time T the real
factor prices p¤
R + e ¡ p and p¤
R ¡ p¤ behave discontinuously and increase by the
amount dp¤
R = 1 while they behave sluggishly in case of a monetary shock. Since
the commodity price shock is by assumption of permanent nature, the steady state
19Bhandari (1981), Bhandari and Turnovsky (1984), Wohltmann and Winkler (2005 a).
20The case _ p¤
R = 0 is discussed at length in Wohltmann and Winkler (2005 a).
23increase in the real factor prices is stronger than in case d _ m = 1. The ¯gures (9)
to (13) illustrate that the steady state e®ects of the oil price shock also depend on
the coe±cients ¯¤
R and ±¤
R in the commodity pricing rule (15). The stag°ationary as
well as the relative price e®ects in absolute terms increase if ¯¤
R decreases and/or ±¤
R
increases. Since the world output gap qw ¡ qw and the foreign in°ation rate _ p¤ are
positive for t > T, a decreasing ¯¤
R and/or an increasing ±¤
R lead to a rising positive
growth rate of the commodity price at time T inducing higher in°ation rates in T
and larger steady state levels of the real factor prices and the domestic and foreign
price levels. Moreover, in this case the fall in the output variables and the in°ation
rates in the time span after the realization of the oil price shock is much stronger.
A further aspect is that a falling ¯¤
R and/or a rising ±¤
R increases the dependency
of the rate of change of the commodity price on the jump variables _ p¤ and qw ¡ qw
so that the volatility of the system in the time span after the realization of the oil
price shock is magni¯ed. The change of the output variables and the in°ation rates
is now much higher, whereas the time path of the terms of trade ¿ is characterized
by a delayed overshooting which increases with falling ¯¤
R and/or increasing ±¤
R.
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Figure 9: Responses of terms of trade ¿, domestic real interest rate i ¡ _ pc and foreign
real interest rate i¤ ¡ _ p¤c to an anticipated permanent commodity price shock in the case
¯¤
R = 1, ±¤
R = 0 (solid lines) and in the case ¯¤
R < 1, ±¤
R > 0 (dashed lines) during the
anticipation phase 0 < t < T (left) and during the implementation phase t > T (right);
initial steady states: dotted lines
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Figure 10: Responses of domestic real commodity price p¤
R+e¡p, foreign real commodity
price p¤
R ¡ p¤ and growth rate of foreign real commodity price _ p¤
R ¡ _ p¤ to an anticipated
permanent commodity price shock in the case ¯¤
R = 1, ±¤
R = 0 (solid lines) and in the
case ¯¤
R < 1, ±¤
R > 0 (dashed lines) during the anticipation phase 0 < t < T (left) and
during the implementation phase t > T (right)
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Figure 11: Responses of domestic and foreign output q and q¤ to an anticipated perma-
nent commodity price shock in the case ¯¤
R = 1, ±¤
R = 0 (solid lines) and in the case
¯¤
R < 1, ±¤
R > 0 (dashed lines) during the anticipation phase 0 < t < T (left) and during
the implementation phase t > T (right)
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Figure 12: Responses of output di®erential q ¡ q¤ and world output gap qw ¡ qw to an
anticipated permanent commodity price shock in the case ¯¤
R = 1, ±¤
R = 0 (solid lines)
and in the case ¯¤
R < 1, ±¤
R > 0 (dashed lines) during the anticipation phase 0 < t < T
(left) and during the implementation phase t > T (right)
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Figure 13: Responses of domestic in°ation rate _ p, foreign in°ation rate _ p¤ and growth
rate of nominal commodity price _ p¤
R to an anticipated permanent commodity price shock
in the case ¯¤
R = 1, ±¤
R = 0 (solid lines) and in the case ¯¤
R < 1, ±¤
R > 0 (dashed lines)
during the anticipation phase 0 < t < T (left) and during the implementation phase t > T
(right)
294.2 Stabilization of the In°ation Rates
Since a once-and-for-all increase in the commodity price p¤
R is connected with tempo-
rary in°ation which may be substantial if the growth rate of p¤
R follows a rule similar
to a wage Phillips equation, the question arises whether a coordination of domestic
and foreign monetary policy is able to stabilize the in°ation rates at their initial
pre-disturbance level. In the following we analyze the dynamic e®ects of monetary
policy rules that are employed by the central bank in an e®ort to ¯x the consumer
in°ation rates _ pc and _ p¤c at their respective initial steady state level _ pc
0 = _ p¤c
0 = 0
at all times. This in°ationary target leads to the decision rules





















(Wohltmann and Winkler (2005 b)). Since the commodity price shock dp¤
R > 0
causes temporary in°ation in both economies during the time span T < t < 1,
the growth rates of domestic and foreign money stock resulting from the policy
rules (26) and (27) are negative over this time interval (¯gures 14 (a) and 15 (a)).
Domestic monetary policy is stronger contractionary than foreign monetary policy
immediately after the oil price shock (i.e., _ m(T+) < _ m¤(T+) < 0). This holds
since in the short run after the realization of an isolated commodity price shock
the in°ation rate based on the consumer price index is higher in the domestic than
in the foreign economy (_ pc(T+) > _ p¤c(T+)). Fixing the consumer in°ation rates
at their respective pre-disturbance steady state level at all times requires the im-
plementation of the policy rules (26) and (27) at the time of anticipation of the
materials price shock, i.e., at time t = 0. An isolated and anticipated commodity
price shock causes domestic in°ation and foreign de°ation during the anticipation
phase 0 < t < T (¯gure 13 (a) and 13 (b)). To avoid this, the monetary policy
rules must already be implemented at time t = 0. Figure 14 (a) illustrates that the
growth rate of domestic money supply is positive during the time span 0 < t < T.
This holds since the anticipation of a strong contractionary monetary policy in re-
sponse to the realization of an oil price shock induces de°ation over the time interval
0 < t < T. The disin°ation is stronger than the weak in°ationary e®ects caused
by the anticipation of a future commodity price shock so that the overall e®ect on
the domestic consumer in°ation rate _ pc is negative. To remove disin°ation an ex-
pansionary domestic monetary policy over the time interval 0 < t < T is necessary.
By contrast, foreign monetary policy is both contractionary for t < T and t > T,
that is, before and after the occurrence of the oil price shock. The growth rate of
foreign money supply is also negative for t < T, since the anticipation of a relatively
strong contractionary domestic monetary policy which is realized immediately after
30the occurrence of the commodity price shock, causes in°ation in the foreign economy
over the time interval 0 < t < T. These in°ationary e®ects are stronger than the
overall disin°ationary e®ects induced by the anticipation of the oil price shock and
the contractionary foreign monetary policy at time T. Therefore, _ m¤ must also be
negative over the time interval 0 < t < T.21 The implementation of the monetary
policy rules (26) and (27) at time t = 0 induces a complete ¯xing of the consumer
in°ation rates at their respective initial steady state level _ pc
0 = _ p¤c
0 = 0 and re-
duces substantially the growth rates of the domestic and foreign price level and the
factor prices (_ p, _ p¤, _ w, _ w¤, _ p¤
R) (¯gures 19 and 20). Moreover, the permanent rise
in the domestic and foreign price level induced by the realization of the oil price
shock is substantially weakened (¯gure 21). The implementation of the monetary
policy rules causes a long run fall in the domestic and foreign money stock (dm < 0,
dm¤ < 0) inducing a strong reduction in the steady state rise in the domestic and
foreign price variables.
Although in°ation targeting requires contractionary monetary policies in the
sense of negative monetary growth rates _ m and _ m¤ for T < t < 1 and a permanent
fall in the domestic and foreign money stock, this does not lead to a magni¯cation of
the steady state output contraction of an isolated oil price shock. On the contrary,
the output contraction is slightly reduced which is a consequence of the long run out-
put expansion caused by a contractionary domestic monetary policy. These e®ects
are marginally larger than the contractionary output e®ects of the foreign mone-
tary policy.22 Moreover, in°ation targeting also has output stabilizing e®ects, i.e.
weakens the dynamic output e®ects of an isolated oil price shock (¯gure 18). With
in°ation targeting the deviation of domestic and foreign output from its respective
initial steady state level during the anticipation phase is smaller than in case of a
passive monetary policy. Furthermore, the output volatility after the realization of
the commodity price increase is reduced.
21Note that in the case of weak anticipation e®ects of the domestic monetary policy rule the growth
rate of foreign money supply is positive for 0 < t < T, while _ m is negative during this time span.
This special case is possible if the commodity pricing rule is characterized by a very high value of
¯¤
R (in particular ¯¤
R = 1) and a small value of ±¤
R. The in°ationary e®ects of an isolated oil price
increase are then relatively small.
22The monetary policy rules (26) and (27) imply dm < dm¤ < 0. Although the long run output
multipliers of domestic monetary policy are smaller (in absolute terms) than the corresponding
multipliers of foreign monetary policy, the overall output e®ect is nearly zero since in the long run
the domestic money stock is stronger reduced than the foreign money stock.
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Figure 14: Growth rate of domestic money supply _ m needed to achieve the in°ation target
_ pc = 0 = _ p¤c due to an anticipated commodity price shock and the resulting development
of domestic money stock m during the anticipation phase 0 < t < T (left) and during the
implementation phase t > T (right)
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Figure 15: Growth rate of foreign money supply _ m¤ needed to achieve the in°ation target
_ pc = 0 = _ p¤c due to an anticipated commodity price shock and the resulting development
of foreign money stock m¤ during the anticipation phase 0 < t < T (left) and during the
implementation phase t > T (right)
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Figure 16: Responses of terms of trade ¿, domestic real interest rate i¡ _ pc and foreign real
interest rate i¤¡ _ p¤c to an anticipated commodity price shock with passive monetary policy
(solid lines) and to an anticipated oil price shock with an in°ation targeting monetary
policy (dashed lines); initial steady states: dotted lines
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Figure 17: Responses of domestic real commodity price p¤
R+e¡p, foreign real commodity
price p¤
R ¡ p¤ and growth rate of foreign real commodity price _ p¤
R ¡ _ p¤ to an anticipated
commodity price shock with passive monetary policy (solid lines) and to an anticipated
oil price shock with an in°ation targeting monetary policy (dashed lines)
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Figure 18: Responses of domestic output q, foreign output q¤ and output di®erential q¡q¤
to an anticipated commodity price shock with passive monetary policy (solid lines) and
to an anticipated oil price shock with an in°ation targeting monetary policy (dashed
lines)












































_ m; _ m¤
_ p; _ p¤
(a)










































_ m; _ m¤
_ p; _ p¤
(a)










































_ m; _ m¤
_ p; _ p¤
(b)










































_ m; _ m¤
_ p; _ p¤
(b)
Figure 19: Responses of domestic price and wage in°ation rate _ p and _ w to an anticipated
commodity price shock with passive monetary policy (solid lines) and to an anticipated
commodity price shock with an in°ation targeting monetary policy (dashed lines)












































_ m; _ m¤
_ p; _ p¤
(a)











































_ m; _ m¤
_ p; _ p¤
(a)









































_ m; _ m¤
_ p; _ p¤
(b)











































_ m; _ m¤
_ p; _ p¤
(b)









































_ m; _ m¤
_ p; _ p¤
(c)










































_ m; _ m¤
_ p; _ p¤
(c)
Figure 20: Responses of foreign price and wage in°ation rate _ p¤ and _ w¤ and growth rate
of nominal commodity price _ p¤
R to an anticipated commodity price shock with passive
monetary policy (solid lines) and to an anticipated commodity price shock with an
in°ation targeting monetary policy (dashed lines)
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Figure 21: Responses of domestic and foreign price level p and p¤ to an anticipated
commodity price shock with passive monetary policy (solid lines) and to an anticipated
commodity price shock with an in°ation targeting monetary policy (dashed lines)
394.3 Output Stabilization
A commodity price shock of the form dp¤
R > 0 causes a permanent rise in the
real factor prices p¤
R ¡ p¤ and p¤
R + e ¡ p and a permanent decline in real output
and income in the domestic and foreign economy. The question therefore arises
whether monetary policy is able to ¯x the steady state output variables q and q¤
at their respective pre-disturbance level q0 and q¤
0 respectively. It can be shown
that the relative multipliers of domestic and foreign monetary policy as well as the
corresponding multipliers of a commodity price shock with respect to real output,


















R + e ¡ p;i ¡ _ p
c;i
¤ ¡ _ p
¤cg
This results holds since
d¿=d _ m
d(p¤












2) ¡ (a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã¤)
¸(f1 + f¤
1 + f2) + 2c3 ¡ (a1 ¡ 2c1)Ã
(¸ = 1 ¡ a1 + 2c1 > 0)
and dxi is representable as linear combination of d¿ and d(p¤
R ¡ p¤), where xi 2
fq;q¤; y;y¤;p¤
R+e¡p;i¡ _ pc;i¤¡ _ p¤cg. An implication of the equality of corresponding
relative multipliers is that the steady state output vector (q;q¤)0 is not statically
controllable with the help of the monetary policy instruments. The corresponding
steady state multiplier matrix has not full rank, i.e.,
rank
Ã
dq=d _ m dq=d _ m¤
dq¤=d _ m dq¤=d _ m¤
!
= 1 < 2 (30)
The policy variables _ m and _ m¤ are therefore linearly dependent with respect to the
target vector (q;q¤)0 so that the number of independent target variables exceeds the
number of linearly independent control variables.24 Nevertheless, monetary policy is
able to compensate the steady state output contraction of a commodity price shock,
i.e., to stabilize the steady state output vector at its initial (pre-disturbance) level.
The equality of the relative multipliers (28) implies that the two-dimensional target
dq = dq¤ = 0 is attainable by means of only one monetary policy instrument, i.e.,
either by means of a contractionary domestic monetary policy or an expansionary
23The proof is presented in the mathematical appendix of this paper.
24Cf. Tinbergen (1952) and Preston and Pagan (1982) for the concept of static controllability.
40foreign monetary policy:












R < 0; d _ m











@q¤=@ _ m¤ ¢ dp
¤
R > 0; d _ m = 0 (32)
In both cases the targets dq = 0 and dq¤ = 0 are simultaneously met so that no
steady state change of the output variables occurs. The monetary policy rules (31)
and (32) also imply d¿ = 0 = d(p¤
R ¡ p¤) = d(p¤
R + e ¡ p), i.e., the constancy of the
steady state values of the terms of trade and the real factor prices. The stabilization
of domestic and foreign steady state output with the help of domestic monetary
policy requires a reduction in the growth rate of domestic money supply, since the
policy d _ m < 0 has positive output e®ects in the long run. Alternatively, the target
dq = 0 = dq¤ can be realized with the help of an expansionary foreign monetary
policy (d _ m¤ > 0) since this policy induces a permanent rise in domestic and foreign
output. A drawback of the policy rules (31) and (32) is that they either lead to
strong de°ation in the domestic economy, while the foreign in°ation rate remains
unchanged in the long run, or to high in°ation in the foreign economy leaving the
domestic steady state in°ation rate constant. This disadvantage can be relaxed
by an international policy coordination, i.e., a simultaneous implementation of a
contractionary domestic and an expansionary foreign monetary policy:












@q=@ _ m¤ ¢ dp
¤
R (34)
with 0 < °¤ < 1.25 Compared to the polar case °¤ = 0 the foreign in°ation rate is
now weaker while the domestic de°ation rate is weaker than in case °¤ = 1. Figures
22 and 23 illustrate the behavior of the domestic and foreign in°ation rate and the










25Note that steady state output stabilization holds for any value of °¤ 2 R. If °¤ < 0, d _ m and d _ m¤
are both negative, while they are both positive if °¤ > 1.
41implying a change of the growth rate of domestic and foreign money supply of equal
size, but in opposite direction (d _ m = ¡d _ m¤).26 The dynamic response of the output
variables to an anticipated commodity price shock is characterized by a temporary
deviation from their respective initial steady state level. In the long run they return
to their initial values.
The question arises whether monetary policy is able to ¯x the output variables
at their respective pre-disturbance steady state level q0 and q¤
0 at all times, i.e.,
to prevent both permanent and temporary deviations from q0 and q¤
0 respectively.
To answer this question it is useful to transform the dynamic macro model into an
economic policy decision model consisting of dynamic state equations and a set of
static equations for the output vector (q;q¤)0.27 In the mathematical appendix it is
shown that the system (1) to (20) can be reduced to the following set of equations:
B_ x = C(x ¡ x) + K(z ¡ z) (36)
v ¡ v = D_ x (37)
where x = (ls;¿;ld)0 is the state vector, z = ( _ m; _ m¤)0 the vector of policy instruments,
v = (q;q¤)0 the target vector and B, C, K and D are matrices of appropriate size.
Since the system matrix B is invertible, the state equations (36) can be solved for
_ x and then inserted into the target equations leading to the static output equations
v ¡ v = DB
¡1C(x ¡ x) + DB
¡1K(z ¡ z) (38)
Generally, the impact multiplier matrix DB¡1K has full rank 2. The target vector
v is therefore perfectly or globally path controllable with the help of the control
vector z.28 Fixing the output vector v at its initial steady state level v = v0 at all
times is possible with the help of the monetary policy rule




The output stabilization condition






causes a reduction in the number of linearly independent state variables. The dy-
namics of the stabilized system can be completely represented by one dynamic state
26Of course, the choice of the policy combination (d _ m, d _ m¤) may be the result of an optimization
approach with a common loss function of the form V = e ®(d _ m)2 + e ¯(d _ m¤)2 (e ®; e ¯ > 0). See below,
equation (42).
27Cf. Preston and Pagan (1982).
28Cf. Aoki (1975), Preston and Pagan (1982) and Wohltmann (1985).
42equation in the state variable ld. Since the corresponding eigenvalue is positive in
general, the new steady state resulting from the exogenous price shock dp¤
R > 0 and
the policy rule (39), is completely unstable. If the real liquidity variables ld and
ls are still considered as predetermined variables there is no nonexplosive solution
of the stabilized state equations.29 A unique convergent solution time path for the
state variable ld only exists if ld is interpreted as a jump variable that jumps at
the date of anticipation. Pegging the output vector v at its initial pre-disturbance
level at all times requires price °exibility so that the price variables p and p¤ are
no longer treated as predetermined. This requires a su±ciently °exible money wage
what appears acceptable since the augmentation term in the wage Phillips curves
(13) and (14) contains the actual rate of CPI in°ation which is perfectly foreseen
by the public.30.
Figures 24 and 25 illustrate the dynamic behavior of the domestic and foreign
growth rate of money supply according to the policy rule (39) and the resulting
development of the in°ation rates, the terms of trade and the foreign real factor
price. Saddlepoint stability of the stabilized system requires that the new steady
state is already attained at time T and that the system remains there thereafter. It
can be shown that the steady state change of the monetary policy vector z resulting
from the rule (39), is not uniquely determined.31 There exists a continuum of policy
combinations (a line in d _ m=d _ m¤ { space) such that each of the corresponding time
paths of the control vector z satisfying the rule (39), completely o®sets the dynamic
output e®ects of the oil price shock. The feasible policy combinations (d _ m;d _ m¤) are
lying on a straight line of the form





















(cf. ¯gure 26). The adjustment time paths in ¯gure 24 result from monetary policy
time paths for which d _ m = d _ m¤ = a=(1 ¡ b) > 0 holds. Such a policy combination
causes a long run fall in the domestic and foreign real money stock of exactly equal
size so that dl
d
= 0 holds and no adjustment dynamics occur. The terms of trade ¿
29Cf. Turnovsky (2000), p. 147.
30Cf. Buiter (1984).
31Note that a similar result holds in the case of steady state output stabilization, i.e. dq = dq¤ = 0.
Cf. equations (33) and (34).
43remain unchanged over time (¿ = ¿0) while the variables _ m, _ m¤, _ p, _ p¤ and p¤
R ¡ p¤
jump on impact and remain constant until time T. At that time they jump into
their new steady state levels and stay there afterwards. Since 0 < d _ m = d _ m¤ holds,
perfect output stabilization is connected with long run in°ation in both economies.
The long run in°ation rates of the symmetric monetary policy d _ m = d _ m¤ can be
reduced if the choice of a feasible policy combination (d _ m, d _ m¤) is the result of an
optimal international policy coordination in which the minimization of the deviation
of the growth rate of money supply from its respective initial pre-disturbance level
is aspired. Each of ¯gures 25 (a) to (25 (f) contain three time paths resulting from
an optimal and asymmetric choice of the policy combination (d _ m, d _ m¤). The solid










i.e., which tries to stabilize the long run in°ation and monetary growth rates at
their respective pre-disturbance steady state level. In this case d _ m < 0 < d _ m¤
holds so that perfect output stabilization is connected with long run de°ation in
the domestic and small long run in°ation in the foreign economy. The foreign
long run in°ation rate _ p¤ is now smaller than in the case dl
d
= 0. In the short
run, the domestic in°ation rate as well as the domestic growth rate of money supply
undershoot their respective new steady state level by a large amount. Moreover, this
policy combination also leads on impact to a strong undershooting of the domestic
terms of trade ¿, while the immediate fall in the foreign real factor price is smaller
than in case dl
d
= 0. The foreign in°ation rate increases on impact and rises further
until time T. The increase in _ p¤ over the interval 0 < t < T is strong which is
a consequence of the international in°ationary e®ects of contractionary domestic
monetary policy (cf. ¯gure 8). At time T the in°ation rates jump into their new
steady state levels where the jumps are stronger than case in dl
d
= 0. The dashed
lines underly a policy combination (d _ m;d _ m¤) which results from the minimization











¤(0+) ¡ _ m¤
0
¢2 (43)
In this case perfect output stabilization is realized with the aid of a time path of
the policy vector for which its initial jump is minimized. Compared to the ¯rst
optimization approach (solid lines), the short run undershooting of _ m and _ p is now
considerably smaller while the long run value of _ m and _ p changes sign, i.e. is positive,
but smaller than in case dl
d
= 0. The initial and long term response of the foreign
in°ation rate is slightly stronger than in the ¯rst optimization approach. However,
44the volatility of _ p¤ over the interval 0 < t < T is now considerably reduced.32 The
volatility of the in°ation rates over the interval 0 < t < T is also small if the choice
of the policy combination (d _ m, d _ m¤) results from the minimization of a loss function
which is a linear combination of V1 and V2:
V3 = ¸VV1 + (1 ¡ ¸V)V2 0 · ¸V · 1 (44)
The weight ¸V measures the importance of the long run deviation of the growth
rate of money supply from its initial value in the loss function V3. The long run
in°ation rates (dotted lines) are now smaller than in case V2 (dashed lines) but larger
than in the ¯rst optimization approach (solid lines). The mixed loss function V3 also
generates initial responses of _ p, _ p¤, ¿ and p¤
R¡p¤ which lie between the corresponding
values in the polar cases V1 and V2. In any of the three optimization approaches the
long run foreign in°ation rate _ p¤ is greater than the corresponding domestic rate _ p.
The policy trade-o® curve in ¯gure 26 illustrates that perfect output stabilization is
also possible with asymmetric monetary policy combinations for which d _ m > d _ m¤
and thus d_ p > d_ p¤ holds. But this would induce high and non acceptable long run
in°ation rates in both economies.
32Note that nearly the same time paths of the variables _ m, _ m¤, _ p, _ p¤, ¿ and p¤
R ¡ p¤ result if the
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0)2¢
dt.
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Figure 22: Responses of domestic and foreign output q and q¤ to an anticipated com-
modity price shock with passive monetary policy (solid lines) and to an anticipated
commodity price shock with an output stabilizing monetary policy (dashed lines); ini-
tial steady states: dotted lines
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Figure 23: Responses of domestic and foreign price in°ation rate _ p and _ p¤ to an an-
ticipated commodity price shock with passive monetary policy (solid lines) and to an
anticipated oil price shock with an output stabilizing monetary policy (dashed lines)










































_ m; _ m¤
_ p; _ p¤
(a)










































_ m; _ m¤
_ p; _ p¤
(b)











































_ m; _ m¤
_ p; _ p¤
(c)
Figure 24: Output stabilizing growth rates of domestic (solid lines) and foreign money
supply (dashed lines) in case dl
d
= 0 and the resulting responses of domestic in°ation
rate _ p (solid lines), foreign in°ation rate _ p¤ (dashed lines), foreign real factor price
p¤
R ¡ p¤ and the terms of trade ¿ (dotted lines)
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Figure 25: Optimal output stabilizing domestic and foreign monetary policies ( _ mjV1,
_ m¤jV1) (solid lines), ( _ mjV2, _ m¤jV2) (dashed lines), ( _ mjV3, _ m¤jV3) (dotted lines) and
the respective responses of domestic in°ation rate _ p, foreign in°ation rate _ p¤, foreign real
factor price p¤
R ¡ p¤ and the terms of trade ¿
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Figure 26: Perfect output stabilizing monetary policy trade-o®
5 Summary of the Main Results
This paper has analyzed a macrodynamic model of two large open economies which
are dependent upon commodity imports from a small third country. It is assumed
that the domestic economy (the European Monetary Union) is stronger dependent
on raw materials imports than the foreign economy (the USA) and that commodity
imports are priced in dollars. The main results of the analysis may be summarized
as follows:
(a) A rise in the growth rate of domestic money supply is not neutral in the long
run but induces a decline in the domestic and foreign real output. Since the
growth rate of the commodity price is coupled with the foreign in°ation rate
and the world output gap, a domestic monetary expansion yields a permanent
increase in the domestic and foreign real commodity price. Only in the special
case that the commodity price does not follow a rule, but is exogenously given,
domestic monetary policy is neutral in the long run. By contrast, a rise in the
growth rate of foreign money supply generally leads to a steady state decline
in the real factor prices and an output expansion in both economies.
(b) The properties of the dynamic time paths following an anticipated or unan-
ticipated monetary expansion have been discussed in the text and the details
need not be repeated here. A consequence of the asymmetric supply side
structure of the two economies is that the domestic and foreign economies are
not a®ected in precisely o®setting ways during the anticipation phase. More-
over, the dynamic response of the system to a domestic monetary shock is not
symmetric to the corresponding response of an equivalent foreign monetary
shock.
50(c) A commodity price shock causes temporary in°ation and a permanent out-
put contraction in both economies. Due to the assumption that the domestic
economy is stronger dependent on raw materials imports, the stag°ationary
e®ects are stronger for the domestic than for the foreign economy. A magni¯-
cation of the stag°ationary e®ects occurs if the commodity price development
is stronger coupled with the foreign in°ation rate and/or the world output
gap.
(d) The in°ationary e®ects caused by commodity price shocks can be removed by a
coordination of domestic and foreign monetary policy. The policy rules imply
a temporary decline in the domestic and foreign growth rate of money supply
after the realization of the raw materials price shock. Such an international
monetary policy coordination has negligible steady state output e®ects so that
the long run output contraction resulting from an isolated commodity price
shock is not ampli¯ed.
(e) Active monetary policy as response to oil price shocks is also able to ¯x simul-
taneously the domestic and foreign steady state output level at its respective
pre-disturbance value. This two-dimensional target is achievable although the
relative output multipliers of domestic and foreign monetary policy are iden-
tical. Fixing the steady state output vector at its initial value requires a
once-and-for-all decrease in the growth rate of domestic money supply and/or
an increase in the growth rate of foreign money supply. Such a policy is con-
nected with domestic de°ation and/or foreign in°ation. These price e®ects are
of moderate size if the change of the domestic growth rate of money supply
equals in absolute terms the change of the corresponding foreign monetary
growth rate.
(f) A remarkable result is that an international monetary policy coordination
is able to ¯x the output vector at its initial equilibrium level at all times.
Since the output vector is impact controllable there exist policy rules for the
domestic and foreign growth rate of money supply that ensure the target path
controllability of the output vector.
(g) Perfect output stabilization may result in a saddlepoint instability problem if
the domestic and foreign price level are considered as predetermined variables.
However, with price °exibility, there exist convergent time paths of the stabi-
lized system. Since the long run change of the growth rate of money supply
is not uniquely determined, ¯xing the output vector at its initial level at all
times is possible with an in¯nite number of time paths of the monetary policy
control vector. It is shown that perfect output stabilization is attainable both
without and with adjustment dynamics. In the ¯rst case monetary policy
51is symmetric in the long run and generates relatively high long run in°ation
rates. In the latter case the monetary policy combination may be the result
of optimization approaches where deviations from the initial value of the con-
trol vector are minimized. In this case output stabilization is associated with




Using the decomposition method of Aoki (1981) the dynamics of the multi-country
model can be represented with the help of three state variables,
l




d = (m ¡ p) ¡ (m
¤ ¡ p
¤) (A2)
¿ = p ¡ (p
¤ + e) (A3)
where the real liquidity variables (ls;ld) are predetermined and real competitiveness
(¿) is a jump variable (cf. Wohltmann and Winkler (2005a) for details).
In the following we use the abbreviations

















































































The model equations (1) { (20) can be transformed into two subsystems, a di®er-
ence and an aggregate system. The di®erence system consists of the di®erence of
corresponding equations of the domestic and foreign economy (like the di®erence of
53the IS equations (1) and (2)) and has the following structure:
¸(q ¡ q
¤) = 2c0 + g ¡ g
¤ ¡ a2i
d
r ¡ (2c3 ¡ (a1 ¡ 2c1)Ã)¿ (A12)
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Similarly, the aggregate system consists of the equations
(1 ¡ a1)(q + q
¤) = 2a0 ¡ 2d0a1 ¡ a2i
s
r + g + g
¤ + a1Ã¿ (A19)
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¤) ¡ 2d0 (A20)
l
s = (® ¡ ®
¤)¿ + 2l0 + l1(q + q
¤) ¡ l2(2i
¤ + _ e) (A21)
q + q
¤ = q + q
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c) + (i
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¤c) = 2i
¤ + _ e ¡ (_ p
c + _ p
¤c) (A24)
_ p
c + _ p
¤c = (® ¡ ®
¤)_ ¿ ¡ _ l
s + _ m + _ m
¤ (A25)
Combining the equations (A18) and (A22) for the growth rate of foreign real factor
price and aggregate real output yields
q + q
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It follows by integration that the foreign real factor price level p¤












































R ¡ p¤)0 + dp
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0) for t > T
where we have assumed that p¤
















R ¡ p¤)0 (A30)
Note that ¿(0+) denotes the right-hand side limit of ¿ if t converges to zero from
the right. If a once-and-for-all increase in the oil price takes places at time T, the
real factor price p¤












R ¡ p¤ converges to a new steady state (p¤
R ¡ p¤)1 given by
(p¤
R ¡ p¤)1 = (p¤
R ¡ p¤)0 + dp
¤
















and depending on the initial jump of ¿, i.e. ¿(0+) ¡ ¿0. Inserting the formulas for
q¡q¤ and p¤
R¡p¤ into the di®erence of the IS and LM equations yields the following
di®erential equations in deviational form:
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2c3 ¡ (a1 ¡ 2c1)Ã
¢
(¿ ¡ ¿)
¡ (a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã
¤)
µ






























































Combining the aggregate IS and LM equation (A19) and (A21) and inserting the
aggregate supply function (A22) the dynamics of the aggregate system can be rep-
resented by
¡
a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1)
¢






























¤)_ ¿ ¡ _ l


























l2a1Ã ¡ a2(® ¡ ®
¤)
¢
¿ + l2(g + g
¤)





+ 2a0l2 ¡ 2l0a2 ¡ 2d0a1l2
Inserting the formula (A29) for the foreign real factor price the dynamics of the
aggregate system can be rewritten in deviational form as follows:
µ¡
a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1)
¢



































































































56where B = (bij)1·i;j;·3 and C = (cij)1·i;j;·3 are given by






















a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1)
¢
·3 ¡ a2l2(® ¡ ®
¤) ¡
¡





































b22 = ¸·1 + a2
¡


































b32 = l1·1 + l2 ¡ l1·2¤ (A45)




















c12 = l2a1Ã ¡ a2(® ¡ ®














2c3 ¡ (a1 ¡ 2c1)Ã
¢





(a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã
¤)Á1 (A52)
c31 = 0 (A53)
c32 = 2 ¡ (® + ®
¤) (A54)
c33 = 1 (A55)
Solution to Dynamics
The dynamic system (A37) exhibits saddlepoint behavior. The system matrix
G = B¡1C = (gij)1·i;j;·3 has two stable eigenvalues (r0;r2) and one unstable root




















(g21g13 ¡ g23(g11 ¡ rj)) (A58)
and
¢j = (g11 ¡ rj)(g22 ¡ rj) ¡ g12g21 (A59)
The uniquely determined convergent solution time path of the state vector (ls;¿;ld)0















































A + e A0h0e
r0t + e A2h2e
r2t for t ¸ T (A61)

















+ (h10 ¡ h12)d¿ (A64)
+ (h12h20 ¡ h10h22)dl
d
¶








+ (h12 ¡ h11)d¿ (A65)
+ (h11h22 ¡ h21h12)dl
d
¶








+ (h11 ¡ h10)d¿ (A66)




d = h10(h21 ¡ h22) + h11(h22 ¡ h20) + h12(h20 ¡ h21) (A67)
Note that the constants A0, A1, A2, e A0, e A2 are linear combinations of the steady
state change of the state variables. Therefore they are dependent upon the speci¯c
form of the shock occurring at time T ¸ 0.
58Steady State Analysis
The steady state of the dynamic system (A37) is obtained if
_ ls = _ ¿ = _ ld = 0 (A68)
holds. This implies according to (A26) and (A27) that the steady state world output
coincides with the long run output level q + q¤ and that (_ p¤
R ¡ _ p¤) is equal to zero.
Thus,
_ p¤ = _ p¤
R = _ p¤c = _ m¤ (A69)
_ p = _ pc = _ m
_ e = _ m ¡ _ m¤
Since there is no long run real interest rate di®erential (i
d
r = 0) the total di®erential




2c3 ¡ (a1 ¡ 2c1)Ã
¢





= (® + ®
¤ ¡ 2)d¿ + l1(dq ¡ dq
¤) ¡ l2(d _ m ¡ d _ m
¤) (A71)
dq ¡ dq
¤ = (f1 + f
¤
1 + f2)d¿ ¡ (f2 ¡ f
¤
2)d(p¤
R ¡ p¤) (A72)
(a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1))(dq + dq














¤ = (f1 + f2 ¡ f
¤
1)d¿ ¡ (f2 + f
¤
2)d(p¤
R ¡ p¤) (A74)
d(p¤
R ¡ p¤) = (p¤
R ¡ p¤)1 ¡ d(p¤
R ¡ p¤)0 (A75)
= dp
¤










¡ ¤(¿(0+) ¡ ¿0)
where the initial jump of ¿ is de¯ned by




















+ (h10 ¡ h12)d¿
+ (h12h20 ¡ h10h22)dl
d
¶
Since the jump of ¿ is a negative function of the length T of the anticipation interval
(0;T), the steady state change of the real factor price and the other endogenous
variables depends on the time span between the anticipation and the realization of
59the underlying shock.
The steady state change of the state variables ¿;ld and ls is now given by the
































2 ¡ ® ¡ ®





















¡ ¤(¿(0+) ¡ ¿0)
¶
= ¡l2(d _ m ¡ d _ m
¤)
¡
l2a1Ã ¡ a2(® ¡ ®



























¡ ¤(¿(0+) ¡ ¿0)
¶
= ¡a2l2(d _ m + d _ m
¤)










































where F = (fij)1·i;j·3 is de¯ned by
f11 = ¸(f1 + f
¤
1 + f2) + (2c3 ¡ (a1 ¡ 2c1)Ã) (A81)
¡ (¸(f2 ¡ f
¤














2) ¡ (a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã
¤))Á2 (A83)
f21 = 2 ¡ ® ¡ ®
¤ ¡ l1(f1 + f
¤
1 + f2) + l1(f2 ¡ f
¤
2)¤ (A84)














l2a1Ã ¡ a2(® ¡ ®


































!1 = ¸(f2 ¡ f
¤
2) ¡ (a1 ¡ 2c1)(Ã ¡ Ã
¤) (A90)
!2 = ¡l1(f2 ¡ f
¤
2) (A91)
!3 = l2a1(Ã + Ã
¤) ¡ (a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1))(f2 + f
¤
2) (A92)







































where e F = (fij)1·i;j·3 is de¯ned by
e f11 = f11 + !1¤e
¡r1T (A94)










e f21 = f21 + !2¤e
¡r1T (A97)










e f31 = f31 + !3¤e
¡r1T (A100)










In the following we use the abbreviations
f11 = ¸(f1 + f
¤














f13 = ¡f12 (A105)
f21 = 2 ¡ ® ¡ ®
¤ ¡ l1(f1 + f
¤
1 + f2) (A106)










f31 = l2a1Ã ¡ a2(® ¡ ®
















f33 = a2 ¡ f32 (A111)
The matrix F = (fij)1·i;j·3 is the steady state matrix in the special case that there
is no endogenous commodity pricing rule, i.e., _ p¤
R = 0 (cf. Wohltmann and Winkler
(2005 a)). The determinant jFj is given by
jFj = f12f31 ¡ f11f32 + a2(f11f22 ¡ f12f21) (A112)
and is always positive. The determinant jFj of the matrix F = (fij)1·i;j·3 can be
expressed in the following form:
jFj = a2
µ








Á1 ¡ Á2 =
2¯¤
·3±
and ¤, Á1 and Á2 are de¯ned by (A9), (A10) and (A11). The ¯rst expression of
jFj, i.e., a2(:::), is in general positive (and typically very small), while the second
expression may be negative since Á2 ? 0. For plausible parameter values jFj > a2f11














is su±cient (but not necessary) for jFj > 0.33 Henceforth, we assume a su±ciently
small value of ±¤
R so that jFj is positive (but smaller than jFj). A su±ciently small
value of ±¤
R also guarantees je Fj > 0, since the di®erence between jFj and je Fj is very











































33Even in the special case ¯¤
R = 0 the determinant jFj is positive if ±¤
R is su±ciently small.
62where the cofactors ¹ij of the steady state matrix e F are given by
¹11 = e f22 e f33 ¡ e f23 e f32 = a2(1 ¡ f23¡1) ¡ f32¡2 (A116)
¹12 = e f21 e f33 ¡ e f23 e f31 = a2(f21 + 2f23¡3) ¡ ¡2(f21f32 + f23f31) (A117)
¹13 = e f21 e f32 ¡ e f22 e f31 = (f21f32 + f23f31)¡1 ¡ f31 + 2f32¡3 (A118)
¹21 = e f12 e f33 ¡ e f13 e f32 = a2f12¡1 (A119)
¹22 = e f11 e f33 ¡ e f13 e f31 = a2(f11 ¡ 2f12¡3) + ¡2(f12f31 ¡ f11f32) (A120)
¹23 = e f11 e f32 ¡ e f12 e f31 = ¡1(f11f32 ¡ f12f31) (A121)
¹31 = e f12 e f23 ¡ e f13 e f22 = f12¡2 (A122)
¹32 = e f11 e f23 ¡ e f13 e f21 = ¡2(f11f23 + f12f21) (A123)
¹33 = e f11 e f22 ¡ e f12 e f21 = f11 ¡ 2f12¡3 ¡ ¡1(f11f23 + f12f21) (A124)
with















Note that the determinant je Fj has the same structure as jFj with Á1, Á2 and ¤
replaced by ¡1, ¡2 and ¡3 respectively:
je Fj = a2
µ







Note further that je Fj = jFj if ¯¤
R = 1 and ±¤
R = 0. Since
e f11 = f11 ¡ 2f12¡3 (A129)
e f12 = f12¡1 (A130)
e f13 = ¡f12¡2 (A131)
e f21 = f21 + 2f23¡3 (A132)
e f22 = 1 ¡ f23¡1 (A133)
e f23 = f23¡2 (A134)
e f31 = f31 ¡ 2f32¡3 (A135)
e f32 = f32¡1 (A136)
e f33 = a2 ¡ f32¡2 (A137)







> 0 , je Fj > 0 and f12 > 0 ;i.e. (A138)
¸(f2 ¡ f
¤





























(¡1 ¡ ¡2) > 0 in general, where (A141)

















¡ a2(f11 ¡ 2f12¡3) + ¡2
µ
a2(f11f23 + f12f21) (A142)
















¡ a2(f11 ¡ 2f12¡3) ¡ ¡2(jFj ¡ a2f11)
¢








¡ a2(f11 ¡ 2f12¡3) + ¡1
µ
a2(f11f23 + f12f21) (A143)
















¡ a2(f11 ¡ 2f12¡3) ¡ ¡1(jFj ¡ a2f11)
¢
< 0 in general
d¿
d _ m¤ = ¡
l2f12a2
je Fj
(¡1 + ¡2) where (A144)
¡1 + ¡2 = Á1 + Á2 + 2¤






















a2(f11 ¡ 2f12¡3) + ¡2
µ
a2(f11f23 + f12f21) (A145)
+ f12f31 ¡ f11f32
¶¶
33See Wohltmann and Winkler (2005 a) for the discussion of this condition.
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¡ a2(f11 ¡ 2f12¡3) + ¡1
µ
a2(f11f23 + f12f21) (A146)
+ f12f31 ¡ f11f32
¶¶
The multipliers with respect to domestic and foreign real money stock can be ob-




. We can rewrite the
formula (A75) for the steady state change of the foreign real factor price in the
following form:
d(p¤
R ¡ p¤) = dp
¤















































2f12a2¡3 + ¡2(f32f11 ¡ f12f31) (A148)















































An expansionary domestic monetary policy is connected with a steady state rise in
the foreign real factor price and generally leads to a small increase in the domestic
terms of trade ¿. Therefore, an increase in the growth rate of domestic money stock
causes a steady state decline in domestic and foreign real output and income! By
contrast, expansionary foreign monetary policy induces generally a fall in (p¤
R ¡ p¤)
and ¿ so that the long run change of q, q¤, y and y¤ is positive. This is the case if
the constant ¡1+¡2 is positive. The formula for ¡1+¡2 shows that ¡1+¡2 may also
be negative, in particular, if Á1 + Á2 is negative, leading to a rise in (p¤
R ¡ p¤) and
an output contraction in both economies. This will be the case if the commodity
pricing rule (15) is characterized by a small value of ¯¤
R (¯¤
R = 0 in particular) and
a su±ciently large value of ±¤
R. Note that all steady state multipliers of a once-and-
for-all commodity price increase are (in absolute terms) increased if the growth rate
of the materials price _ p¤
R is not exogenously given (as in Wohltmann and Winkler
65(2005 a)) but is endogenized according to the pricing rule (15). In this case the only
di®erence between corresponding steady state multipliers is that the determinant
jFj has to be replaced by je Fj which is smaller than jFj. This implies that the steady
state stag°ationary e®ects of an oil price shock are magni¯ed if _ p¤
R is coupled with
the foreign in°ation rate _ p¤ and the world output gap q + q¤ ¡ (q + q¤).
The monetary policy multipliers as well as the multiplier of a commodity price
shock with respect to ¿ and (p¤
R ¡ p¤) imply
d¿=d _ m
d(p¤














i.e., the equality of the relative multipliers of domestic monetary policy, foreign
monetary policy and a materials price shock with respect to (¿;p¤
R ¡ p¤).35 Since
dq = (f1 + f2)d¿ ¡ f2d(p¤







R ¡ p¤) (A153)
d(p¤
R + e ¡ p) = ¡d¿ + d(p¤
R ¡ p¤) (A154)
dy = dq ¡ Ãd(p¤












¡ (1 ¡ a1)(dq + dq
¤) + a1Ãd¿ (A157)




the steady state change of any variable xi 2 fq;q¤;p¤
R+e¡p;y;y¤;is
rg is representable
as a linear combination of d¿ and d(p¤
R ¡ p¤), i.e.,
dxi = ®i1d¿ + ®i2d(p¤










































35Note that the relative multiplier of domestic monetary policy is only de¯ned if ±¤
R > 0 (so that
¤ > 0); otherwise, d¿=d _ m = d(p¤
R ¡ p¤)=d _ m = 0.
















are identical for any xi;xj 2 f¿;p¤
R ¡ p¤;q;q¤;p¤
R + e ¡ p;y;y¤;i
s
rg.
Stabilization of the Steady State Output
An implication of the equality of the relative multipliers (A162) is that the economic
policy target to ¯x simultaneously the steady state output variables q and q¤ at their
respective initial steady state level (dq = 0 = dq¤) is attainable with the help of only










d _ m +
@q
@ _ m¤d _ m
¤ = 0 (A163)
implies











R < 0 (A164)












R > 0 (A165)











d _ m +
@q¤
@ _ m¤d _ m
¤ = 0 (A166)
leads to the decision rules























@q=@ _ m¤ ¢ dp
¤
R (A168)
(if d _ m = 0) which are equivalent to (A164) and (A165) respectively. Equality of
(A164) and (A167) and (A165) and (A168) respectively is given since the relative
output multipliers are identical. The target dq = dq¤ = 0 is also achievable with the


























with 0 < °¤ < 1. If °¤ < 1, the in°ationary e®ects caused by d _ m¤ > 0 are smaller
than in the polar case °¤ = 1. The same holds for the de°ationary e®ects caused by
d _ m < 0 in case °¤ > 0 compared to °¤ = 0. The constant °¤ can be determined if




























Note that the output target dq = 0 = dq¤ is attainable by any policy combination
(d _ m;d _ m¤) satisfying the linear relationship





















This follows either from equation (A163) or from (A169), (A170) by solving (A169)
for °¤ and then inserting this expression into (A170). In general, ¡1+¡2 > ¡1¡¡2 >
0 holds; the policy trade-o® curve (A173) has therefore a positive slope in (d _ m¤=d _ m)-
space.
In°ation Rate Stabilization
The stabilization of the consumer in°ation rates _ pc and _ p¤c with the aid of suitable
monetary policy rules leads to the following decision rules: Since
_ p
c = (_ p
c ¡ _ p) + (_ p ¡ _ m) + _ m (A174)








d + _ m
the target _ pc = 0 is attainable if









68Similarly, the target _ p¤c = 0 implies
_ m











_ m ¡ _ m
¤ = (2 ¡ ® ¡ ®
¤)_ ¿ + _ l
d (A177)
and
_ m + _ m
¤ = (®
¤ ¡ ®)_ ¿ + _ l
s (A178)
The endogenization of the growth rate of domestic and foreign money supply causes
a change in the system matrix B of the state space representation (A37). In the
case of simultaneous in°ation rate stabilization the matrix B has to be replaced by
B0 = (bij)1·i;j·3 where
b
0















12 = b12 + a2l2(® ¡ ®
¤) =
¡
a2l1 + l2(1 ¡ a1)
¢¡
·3 ¡ ·4¤) (A180)
b
0





























































32 = b32 ¡ l2(2 ¡ ® ¡ ®
















Note that the matrix C in (A37) remains unchanged. The monetary policy rules
(A175) and (A176) imply that the level of domestic and foreign money supply is
given by
















0 ¡ (1 ¡ ®













The formulas for m and m¤ result on the condition that m and m¤ are predetermined
variables which are continuous at time t = 0. Although _ m = _ m¤ = 0 in the long run,
the policy rules for _ m and _ m¤ are connected with a permanent change of domestic
69and foreign money stock:










¡ (1 ¡ ®)(¿(0+) ¡ ¿0) (A190)








































+ (1 ¡ ®
¤)(¿(0+) ¡ ¿0) (A191)































In the case of the commodity price shock dp¤
R > 0 the steady state change of m and
m¤ is negative so that the permanent price increase induced by the oil price shock is
reduced. Note that the steady state e®ects of the oil price shock on the state vector
(¿;ld;ls)0 change in the case of in°ation rate stabilization. Although the elements
fij of the matrix F in (A80) remain unchanged there is a quantitative change in
the elements of e F in (A93). The reason is that the stabilized system causes adjust-
ments in the eigenvalues and eigenvectors leading to a change of the initial jump of ¿.
Perfect Stabilization of the Output Time Path
Instead of in°ation rate stabilization, monetary policy is also able to ¯x the output
vector (q;q¤)0 at its initial steady state level (q0;q¤
0)0 at all times, i.e. q = q0, q¤ = q¤
0
for all t ¸ 0. The following output equations can be derived from the equations of






































































































_ m ¡ _ m
_ m¤ ¡ _ m¤
!
(A199)
where K = (kij)1·i·3
1·j·2
is given by
k11 = a2l2 (A200)
k12 = a2l2 (A201)
k21 = 0 (A202)
k22 = 0 (A203)
k31 = l2 (A204)
k32 = ¡l2 (A205)




















_ m ¡ _ m
_ m¤ ¡ _ m¤
!
(A206)
Note that rank D = rank K = 2 and in general jDB¡1Kj 6= 0 holds. The target
vector (q;q¤)0 is therefore target path controllable with the help of the policy vector
( _ m; _ m¤)0. The invertibility of the impact multiplier matrix DB¡1K implies the
71monetary policy decision rules
Ã
_ m ¡ _ m














































where e C = C ¡ KS = (e cij)1·i;j;·3 is de¯ned by
e c11 = c11 ¡ a2l2(s11 + s21) (A210)
e c12 = c12 ¡ a2l2(s12 + s22) (A211)
e c13 = c13 ¡ a2l2(s13 + s23) (A212)
e c21 = c21 (A213)
e c22 = c22 (A214)
e c23 = c23 (A215)
e c31 = c31 ¡ l2(s11 ¡ s21) (A216)
e c32 = c32 ¡ l2(s12 ¡ s22) (A217)
e c33 = c33 ¡ l2(s13 ¡ s23) (A218)
Note that je Cj = jB¡1e Cj = 0 holds since the output equations (A191) and the policy
target q = q, q¤ = q¤ imply that there is only one linearly independent state variable.

















s = ¡´1_ l
d (A220)











The stabilized state equation (A209) then yields the following dynamic equation for
ld:
(¡b31´1 ¡ b32´2 + b33)_ l






e c31´1 + e c32´2 ¡ e c33
b31´1 + b32´2 ¡ b33
= ¡(e g31´1 + e g32´2 ¡ e g33) (A225)
with (e gij)1·i;j;·3 = B¡1e C is ambiguous in sign.36 Several numerical simulations clar-
ify that e r2 is positive if the semi-interest elasticity of private absorption is su±ciently
large. It is therefore reasonable to assume e r2 > 0. This implies that the new long run
equilibrium resulting from the permanent oil price shock dp¤
R > 0 and the monetary
policy rules (A207) is completely unstable. A unique convergent solution time path
of the state variable ld only exists if ld is not predetermined but a jump variable
that jumps whenever ¿ jumps. This is a natural assumption, since (A221) implies
by integration that there is a linear relationship between ¿ and ld. The assumption
is also justi¯ed from an economic point of view, since perfect stabilization of the
output time path along the initial steady state level requires an immediate change
of the growth rate of domestic and foreign money supply at the date of anticipation
of the oil price shock inducing in°ationary or de°ationary processes without delay.


















0. After its initial jump, which occurs if dl
d
6= 0, the state variable
ld converges monotonically to its new steady state level l
d
1 which is reached at time
T. Thereafter, it must stay there, otherwise no bounded solution time path of ld
would exist. The same must hold for the other endogenous variables of the stabilized
system. Assuming ¿ = ¿1 and ls = l
s
1 for t ¸ T the time paths of ¿ and ls over the
36Note that the eigenvalue e r2 does not change if the dynamics of the stabilized system is expressed
in terms of ¿ instead of ld.
73anticipation period 0 < t < T are given by
¿ = ¿1 ¡ ´2(l
d ¡ l
d















with d¿ = 0. Inserting the solution time paths of the state variables into (A206)
yields the time path of the growth rate of domestic and foreign money supply.


































for 0 < t < T
_ m = _ m1 = _ m0 + d _ m for t ¸ T (A231)
_ m

























for 0 < t < T
_ m
¤ = _ m¤
1 = _ m¤
0 + d _ m¤ for t ¸ T (A233)
where the steady state change of _ m and _ m¤ results from (A207), (A208) and the
long run stabilization condition dq = dq¤ = d¿ = d(p¤



























with (cf. (A47), (A49))










74and k11, k12, k31, k32, c31, c33 given by (A200), (A201), (A204), (A205), (A53) and






























d(m ¡ p) (A239)










d(m¤ ¡ p¤) (A240)
If the foreign real factor price p¤
R ¡ p¤ is viewed as jump variable that jumps at the





R ¡ p¤)1 ¡ dp
¤





















































R ¡ p¤)1 = (p¤
R ¡ p¤)0 + d(p¤
R ¡ p¤) for t ¸ T (A242)
where steady state output stabilization implies d(p¤
R ¡ p¤) = 0. At time T, p¤
R ¡ p¤
jumps by the amount dp¤
R back into its initial steady state level and remains there
thereafter. If p¤
R ¡p¤ is not predetermined at time t = 0, the steady state change of
p¤
R ¡ p¤ is independent of the initial jump of ¿, i.e., ¿(0+) ¡ ¿ 0 (cf. (A75)).
The solution time paths for ls, ld, ¿, _ m, _ m¤ and p¤
R ¡ p¤ depend on the steady




, consider the policy target
q = q0, q¤ = q¤
0 (for all t) implying dq = dq¤ = 0 and therefore d¿ = d(p¤
R ¡ p¤) = 0.
















75since f12 = 1
2!1Á1 and f12 = ¡1
2!2Á2. Further steady state equations of the stabilized
system result from (A71) and (A73):
dl
d
= ¡l2(d _ m ¡ d _ m¤) (A245)
dl
s
= ¡l2(d _ m + d _ m¤) (A246)
Obviously, equations (A245) and (A246) are equivalent to (A239), (A240). They
can also be derived from (A78), (A79).
Inserting (A245), (A246) into (A243) yields the relation between d _ m and d _ m¤
which must hold in order to realize the output target q = q0 and q¤ = q¤
0 simultane-
ously:37








d _ m¤ (A247)












no adjustment dynamics occur. The state variable ld and ¿ remain constant over
time (ld = l
d
0, ¿ = ¿0 for t ¸ 0) while the variable ls immediately jumps into its





R and stays there afterwards. According to
(A241) the real factor price p¤
R ¡ p¤ on impact jumps by the amount ¡dp¤
R = ¡1
and jumps by the same amount back into its initial steady state level at time T.
The policy variables _ m and _ m¤ also jump on impact and at time T, where the jump
in T is given by

































¤(T+) ¡ _ m





















R in the special case dl
d
= 0.
The policy combination (A248) is connected with long run in°ation in both
economies. An alternative solution with a smaller in°ation rate in the foreign econ-
omy and with long run de°ation in the domestic economy results from the optimiza-















d _ m ; d _ m
¤ (A251)
subject to the condition (A247). Inserting equation (A247) into the loss function

















A drawback of the optimization problem (A251) is that it only considers long run
deviations of the domestic and foreign growth rate of money stock from its respective
initial steady state level, i.e., short term deviations are neglected. On impact, the
fall in the domestic growth rate of money supply may be very strong yielding a sharp
de°ationary process in the domestic economy. An international policy coordination
that minimizes both short term and long term deviations of the growth rate of money


















d _ m ; d _ m¤ (A254)









®1 = (s11 + s11´1 + s12´2)al2 (A257)
®2 = (s11(1 + b) ¡ (s11´1 + s12´2)(1 ¡ b))l2 (A258)
¯1 = ¡al2(s11´1 + s12´2 ¡ s13) (A259)
¯2 = (s11´1 + s12´2 ¡ s13)(1 ¡ b)l2 (A260)
®
¤
1 = (s21 + s21´1 + s22´2)al2 (A261)
®
¤
2 = (s21(1 + b) ¡ (s21´1 + s22´2)(1 ¡ b))l2 (A262)
¯
¤
1 = ¡al2(s21´1 + s22´2 ¡ s23) (A263)
¯
¤
2 = (s21´1 + s22´2 ¡ s23)(1 ¡ b)l2 (A264)
77the solution time paths for _ m and _ m¤ over the time interval (0;T) can be written
as follows
_ m ¡ _ m0 = ®1 + ®2d _ m¤ + ¯1e
e r2(t¡T) + ¯2e
e r2(t¡T)d _ m¤ (A265)
_ m





2d _ m¤ + ¯
¤
1e
e r2(t¡T) + ¯
¤
2e
e r2(t¡T)d _ m¤ (A266)
where we have assumed dp¤








f1(t) + f2(t)d _ m¤¤2 +
£
































f1(t) = ®1 + ¯1e
e r2(t¡T) (A268)














Di®erentiation with respect to d _ m¤ yields the optimization condition
de V2
d _ m¤ =
Z T
0










dt = 0 (A272)
The optimal value of d _ m¤ is then given by
d _ m¤¯ ¯
e V2 = ¡
R T






































































The optimal solution for d _ m follows from the policy trade-o® (A247).
The choice of the policy combination (d _ m;d _ m¤) which satis¯es the trade-o®











¤(0+) ¡ _ m¤
0
¢2 ! min
d _ m ; d _ m¤ (A276)
subject to the conditions (A230), (A232), (A245) { (A247). In this case the optimal
policy choice is given by









V2 = a + b ¢ d _ m¤¯ ¯
V2 (A278)
where fj(0) and gj(0) (j = 1;2) are the initial values of the functions fj and gj
de¯ned in (A268) { (A271). The optimal choice of (d _ m;d _ m¤) may also be the result
of the minimization of a loss function V3 which is a combination of the functions V1
and V2 with a weight 0 · ¸V · 1:
V3 = ¸VV1 + (1 ¡ ¸V)V2 ! min
d _ m ; d _ m¤ (A279)
In this case an international monetary policy coordination simultaneously minimizes
the initial and steady state deviation of the growth rate of money supply from its
initial value. The result of the minimization of V3 is given by
d _ m¤¯ ¯
V3 = ¡












V3 = a + b ¢ d _ m¤¯ ¯
V3 (A281)
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